National security laws: the United States, China, France and Europe
The World I Live In shows three countries: the United States, China and France. This page names the laws that give each of them, and the European Union, powers to watch people, to keep secrets and to act in the name of national security, and the rules and court rulings that limit those powers. Each entry gives its date, a short quotation of its key text and a link to the official text, all checked on 25 and 26 September 2026.
United States
National Security Act of 1947 (1947)
Codified in title 50 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), it creates the National Security Council and provides for the Central Intelligence Agency. The President must keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of intelligence activities; their prior approval is not required.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall- (1) collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions; […]
— §104A(d)(1), 50 U.S.C. 3036(d)(1)
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and its Section 702 (1978 / 2008)
FISA lets the government surveil foreign powers and their agents with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) orders. Section 702 (targeting non-United States persons abroad without a court order per target) was repealed on June 12, 2026; orders then in effect continue until they expire.
The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate 11 district court judges […] who shall constitute a court which shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States […]
— §103(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. 1803(a)(1)
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (2001)
The Act lets courts delay notice of search warrants to their targets and lets the Attorney General certify and detain foreign nationals, subject to judicial review. Its Section 215 orders for business records lapsed on March 15, 2020, except for investigations begun earlier.
[…] any notice required, or that may be required, to be given may be delayed if-- (1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result (as defined in section 2705); […]
— §213, as enacted in 2001 (it created 18 U.S.C. 3103a(b), on delayed notice of search warrants)
Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 (USA FREEDOM Act of 2015) (2015)
It ended bulk collection under Section 215 by requiring each order to use a specific identifier, such as a name or account. It added amici curiae (independent advisers) to the FISC and has the Director of National Intelligence review significant FISC opinions for public release.
No order issued under this subsection may authorize the collection of tangible things without the use of a specific selection term that meets the requirements of subsection (b)(2).
— §103(b), as enacted in 2015
Executive Order 12333 — United States intelligence activities (1981)
An executive order, not a statute, it sets the executive-branch framework for all United States intelligence activities, including collection abroad. Its 1981 text lets agencies collect information on United States persons only under procedures approved by the Attorney General; the order was amended in 2008.
Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order.
— §2.3 (1981 text)
Espionage Act of 1917 (1917)
The Act of June 15, 1917, known by this popular name, makes it a crime to willfully pass national-defense information to people not entitled to receive it, or keep it without authorization; delivering it to a foreign government can carry the death penalty in narrow cases. Prosecutions go through ordinary federal courts and juries.
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document […] relating to the national defense […] willfully communicates, delivers, transmits […] the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; […]
— 18 U.S.C. 793(e)
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) (1980)
In federal criminal cases, the judge may let the government withhold classified information from the defendant or substitute a summary. If the Attorney General blocks disclosure by sworn statement, the court must dismiss the charges unless the interests of justice call for another remedy.
The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant through discovery […], to substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.
— §4
State secrets privilege — United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)
This rule of evidence, recognized by the Supreme Court, lets the government withhold evidence from civil cases through a formal claim by the head of the department concerned. The trial court decides whether the claim is appropriate and need not always examine the evidence.
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers. […] It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.
— United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (footnote numbers removed)
National Emergencies Act (1976)
It lets the President declare a national emergency, switching on special powers that other laws reserve for emergencies. Congress can end an emergency by a joint resolution enacted into law, and each emergency ends on its anniversary unless the President publishes a notice continuing it.
With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President is authorized to declare such national emergency. Such proclamation shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.
— §201(a), 50 U.S.C. 1621(a)
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act) (2018)
Under it, United States legal process for stored communications reaches data that providers subject to United States jurisdiction hold anywhere in the world. It allows executive agreements, which Congress can block within 180 days, letting qualifying foreign governments seek data directly from United States providers.
A provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service shall comply with the obligations of this chapter to preserve, backup, or disclose the contents of a wire or electronic communication […] within such provider’s possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such communication, record, or other information is located within or outside of the United States.
— 18 U.S.C. 2713
The United States intelligence community
50 U.S.C. § 3003, which is section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947, defines the intelligence community (IC) in paragraph (4). The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) publishes the official list of the 18 IC members.
The term “intelligence community” includes the following: […] (L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.
— 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4), official text published by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel, as of 25 September 2026
| Member | Part of | Legal basis |
|---|---|---|
| Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), began operations in 2005 | Independent | Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(A); Public Law 108–458 (2004), section 1073, rewrote the definition around the ODNI |
| Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), established 1947 | Independent | National Security Act of 1947; 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(B); Executive Order (EO) 12333, section 1.8 of the 1981 text |
| Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), established 1961 | Department of Defense | Department of Defense Directive 5105.21 of August 1961, which the DIA calls its charter; 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(D); EO 12333, section 3.4(f) of the 1981 text |
| National Security Agency / Central Security Service (NSA/CSS); the NSA was established in 1952 | Department of Defense | Memorandum of 24 October 1952 by President Truman; 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(C); EO 12333, section 3.4(f) of the 1981 text |
| National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), established 1996 as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), renamed 2003 | Department of Defense | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(E); Public Law 104–201 (1996) and Public Law 108–136 (2003) wrote into subparagraph (E) the names NIMA and then NGA |
| National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), established 1961 | Department of Defense | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(F) |
| Army Intelligence; listed on intelligence.gov, the public website of the IC, as the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); INSCOM was established in 1977 | Department of Defense (Army) | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H); EO 12333, section 3.4(f) of the 1981 text |
| Navy Intelligence; listed on intelligence.gov as the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI); ONI was established in 1882 | Department of Defense (Navy) | General Order No. 292 of 23 March 1882, by Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt; 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H); EO 12333, section 3.4(f) of the 1981 text |
| Marine Corps Intelligence | Department of Defense (Marine Corps) | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H); EO 12333, section 3.4(f) of the 1981 text |
| Air Force Intelligence | Department of Defense (Air Force) | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H); EO 12333, section 3.4(f) of the 1981 text |
| Space Force Intelligence; listed on intelligence.gov as the United States Space Force (USSF); the USSF was established in 2019 | Department of Defense (Department of the Air Force) | Designation of the intelligence element of the USSF as an IC member, announced by the Director of National Intelligence in January 2021; 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H); Public Law 117–263 (2022), section 6421, added the Space Force to subparagraph (H) |
| Department of Energy Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE-IN), formed 2006 by merging the Office of Intelligence and the Office of Counterintelligence | Department of Energy | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H); EO 12333, sections 1.13 and 3.4(f) of the 1981 text, which name the Department of Energy |
| Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), established 2005 | Department of Homeland Security | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(K); Public Law 107–296 (2002) added Department of Homeland Security elements to the definition; Public Law 112–87 (2012), section 431, rewrote subparagraph (K) to name the Office of Intelligence and Analysis |
| United States Coast Guard Intelligence (CG-2) | Department of Homeland Security (14 U.S.C. § 103(a)) | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H); Public Law 107–108 (2001) added the Coast Guard to the definition; Public Law 111–259 (2010), section 441, set its place in subparagraph (H) |
| Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), established 1908 | Department of Justice | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H); EO 12333, section 1.14 of the 1981 text |
| Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Office of National Security Intelligence; the DEA was created in 1973 | Department of Justice (Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973) | Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 (for the DEA); 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(H); Public Law 111–259 (2010), section 441, added the DEA to subparagraph (H) |
| Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), established 1947 by Secretary of State George Marshall | Department of State | 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(I); EO 12333, sections 1.9 and 3.4(f) of the 1981 text |
| Department of the Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) | Department of the Treasury | Intelligence Authorization Act of 2004, under which the OIA was created; 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4)(J); Public Law 108–177 (2003), section 105(d)(1), gave the OIA its own subparagraph in the definition; EO 12333, sections 1.10 and 3.4(f) of the 1981 text, which name the Department of the Treasury |
China
National Security Law — 中华人民共和国国家安全法 (2015)
Citizens and organizations must report leads on activities endangering national security, provide evidence, support and assist state security, public security and military organs, and keep state secrets. National security work is under Communist Party of China leadership; a central national security leadership body coordinates it.
国家安全是指国家政权、主权、统一和领土完整、人民福祉、经济社会可持续发展和国家其他重大利益相对处于没有危险和不受内外威胁的状态，以及保障持续安全状态的能力。
— Article 2
“National security refers to the relative absence of international or domestic threats to the state’s power to govern, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major national interests, and the ability to ensure a continued state of security.” (translation, China Law Translate, unofficial)
National Intelligence Law — 中华人民共和国国家情报法 (2017, amended 2018)
It lets intelligence institutions work inside and outside China, request support from organs, organizations and citizens, and use technical reconnaissance measures after strict approval. The central national security leadership body leads national intelligence work; the Central Military Commission leads military intelligence work.
任何组织和公民都应当依法支持、协助和配合国家情报工作，保守所知悉的国家情报工作秘密。
国家对支持、协助和配合国家情报工作的个人和组织给予保护。
— Article 7
“All organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with law, and shall protect national intelligence work secrets they are aware of. The State is to protect individuals and organizations that support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts.” (translation, China Law Translate, unofficial)
Law on Guarding State Secrets — 中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法 (1988, revised 2010 and 2024)
All state organs, armed forces, political parties, organizations, enterprises and citizens have a duty of secrecy; network operators must stop transmitting suspected leaks, report them and delete them on request. The Communist Party of China and a central secrecy work leadership body lead secrecy work.
国家秘密是关系国家安全和利益，依照法定程序确定，在一定时间内只限一定范围的人员知悉的事项。
— Article 2
“State secrets are matters related to national security and interests, determined in accordance with legally prescribed procedures, and known to a limited range of personnel within a certain period of time.” (translation, China Law Translate, unofficial)
Counterespionage Law — 中华人民共和国反间谍法 (2014, revised 2023)
State security organs are in charge of counterespionage work, and every citizen and organization must support and assist it and keep its secrets. Provincial-level state security organs may bar people suspected of espionage from leaving the country.
国家安全机关工作人员依法执行反间谍工作任务时，经设区的市级以上国家安全机关负责人批准，出示工作证件，可以查验有关个人和组织的电子设备、设施及有关程序、工具。[…]
— Article 25
“When executing a counterespionage assignment in accordance with the law, staff members of a state security organ may, with the approval of the person in charge of the relevant state security organ at or above the level of a city divided into districts and upon presenting their work certificates, examine the electronic equipment, facilities, and relevant programs and tools of the relevant individuals or organizations. […]” (National People’s Congress translation, “for reference only”)
Counter-Terrorism Law — 中华人民共和国反恐怖主义法 (2015, amended 2018)
Telecommunications operators and internet service providers must stop transmitting, delete and report terrorist or extremist content, and telecom, internet, financial, lodging, long-distance passenger transport and vehicle-rental businesses must verify customers' identities. A national counter-terrorism leading body leads counter-terrorism work nationwide.
电信业务经营者、互联网服务提供者应当为公安机关、国家安全机关依法进行防范、调查恐怖活动提供技术接口和解密等技术支持和协助。
— Article 18
“Telecommunications operators and internet service providers shall provide technical interfaces, decryption and other technical support assistance to public security organs and state security organs conducting prevention and investigation of terrorist activities in accordance with law.” (translation, China Law Translate, unofficial)
Cybersecurity Law — 中华人民共和国网络安全法 (2016, amended 2025)
Network operators must give technical support and assistance to public security and state security organs; critical information infrastructure operators must store in China the personal information and important data collected or produced there. The national cyberspace department coordinates cybersecurity work and its supervision.
因维护国家安全和社会公共秩序，处置重大突发社会安全事件的需要，经国务院决定或者批准，可以在特定区域对网络通信采取限制等临时措施。
— Article 60 (Article 58 in the 2016 text, same wording)
“As needed to preserve national security and societal public order, and to respond to major public safety incidents, temporary measures such as restrictions on network communications may be adopted in specified areas after a decision or approval from the State Council.” (translation, China Law Translate, unofficial)
Data Security Law — 中华人民共和国数据安全法 (2021)
Organizations and individuals in China may not give data stored in China to foreign judicial or law-enforcement bodies without approval from the competent Chinese authorities. The central national security leadership body makes decisions on and coordinates national data security work.
公安机关、国家安全机关因依法维护国家安全或者侦查犯罪的需要调取数据，应当按照国家有关规定，经过严格的批准手续，依法进行，有关组织、个人应当予以配合。
— Article 35
“Where a public security organ or national security organ needs to obtain data for the sake of national security or for investigating crimes in accordance with the law, strict approval formalities shall be completed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the state and data be obtained in accordance with the law, and the relevant organizations and individuals shall cooperate.” (National People’s Congress translation, “for reference only”)
Personal Information Protection Law — 中华人民共和国个人信息保护法 (2021)
State organs processing personal information must act within their statutory powers and procedures; critical information infrastructure operators and large-volume processors must store in China the personal information collected and generated there. The national cyberspace department coordinates personal information protection and its supervision.
在公共场所安装图像采集、个人身份识别设备，应当为维护公共安全所必需，遵守国家有关规定，并设置显著的提示标识。所收集的个人图像、身份识别信息只能用于维护公共安全的目的，不得用于其他目的；取得个人单独同意的除外。
— Article 26
“Image collection and personal identification equipment in public places shall be installed only when it is necessary for the purpose of maintaining public security, and shall be installed in compliance with the relevant provisions of the state and with prominent reminders. The personal images and identification information collected can only be used for the purpose of maintaining public security and, unless the individuals' separate consents are obtained, shall not be used for any other purpose.” (National People’s Congress translation, “for reference only”)
France
Loi n° 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 relative au renseignement (2015)
A law letting intelligence services use intelligence-gathering techniques for seven purposes, including national defence and terrorism prevention. In France, the Prime Minister authorises them after an opinion of the Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement (CNCTR); the Conseil d’État hears appeals.
Pour le seul exercice de leurs missions respectives, les services spécialisés de renseignement peuvent recourir aux techniques mentionnées au titre V du présent livre pour le recueil des renseignements relatifs à la défense et à la promotion des intérêts fondamentaux de la Nation suivants : […]
— Code de la sécurité intérieure (Internal Security Code), art. L. 811-3
“For the sole exercise of their respective missions, the specialised intelligence services may use the techniques mentioned in Title V of this book to collect intelligence relating to the defence and promotion of the following fundamental interests of the Nation: […]” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
Loi n° 2015-1556 du 30 novembre 2015 relative aux mesures de surveillance des communications électroniques internationales (2015)
A law adding a chapter on surveillance of international electronic communications to the Internal Security Code, after the Conseil constitutionnel struck down the first version of article L. 854-1 in July 2015. It lets the state authorise surveillance of communications sent or received abroad.
Dans les conditions prévues au présent chapitre, peut être autorisée, aux seules fins de défense et de promotion des intérêts fondamentaux de la Nation mentionnés à l’article L. 811-3, la surveillance des communications qui sont émises ou reçues à l’étranger.
— Code de la sécurité intérieure, art. L. 854-1, first sentence, as enacted in 2015
“Under the conditions provided for in this chapter, the surveillance of communications sent or received abroad may be authorised, for the sole purposes of defending and promoting the fundamental interests of the Nation mentioned in Article L. 811-3.” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement (2015)
An oversight body, not a law: the CNCTR gives an opinion before the Prime Minister authorises an intelligence technique in France. It has nine members: four parliamentarians, two Conseil d’État members, two Cour de cassation judges and one person qualified in electronic communications.
La Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement est une autorité administrative indépendante.
— Code de la sécurité intérieure, art. L. 831-1, first sentence
“The National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques is an independent administrative authority.” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
Code pénal, art. 413-9 and following — atteintes au secret de la défense nationale (Code pénal 1994; wording since 2009)
Criminal Code articles: a person holding a national defence secret who destroys or reproduces it, or discloses it without authorisation, is punished by seven years' imprisonment and a €100,000 fine. The Commission du secret de la défense nationale (National Defence Secrecy Commission) advises on declassification.
Présentent un caractère de secret de la défense nationale au sens de la présente section les procédés, objets, documents, informations, réseaux informatiques, données informatisées ou fichiers intéressant la défense nationale qui ont fait l’objet de mesures de classification destinées à restreindre leur diffusion ou leur accès.
— Code pénal (Criminal Code), art. 413-9, first paragraph
“Procedures, objects, documents, information, computer networks, computerised data or files of interest to national defence that have been the subject of classification measures intended to restrict their dissemination or access have the character of a national defence secret within the meaning of this section.” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
Code pénal, art. 411-1 and following — De la trahison et de l’espionnage (1994)
Code pénal (Criminal Code) articles defining offences and penalties. For example, delivering to a foreign power information whose exploitation, disclosure or gathering is liable to harm the fundamental interests of the nation is punished by fifteen years' criminal detention and a €225,000 fine.
Les faits définis par les articles 411-2 à 411-11 constituent la trahison lorsqu’ils sont commis par un Français ou un militaire au service de la France et l’espionnage lorsqu’ils sont commis par toute autre personne.
— Code pénal, art. 411-1
“The acts defined in Articles 411-2 to 411-11 constitute treason when committed by a French national or a member of the armed forces serving France, and espionage when committed by any other person.” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
Loi n° 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence (1955)
Under this law, a state of emergency is declared by decree in the Council of Ministers; extension beyond twelve days needs a law. The interior minister may order house arrest where there are serious reasons to think a person’s behaviour threatens public security and order.
L’état d’urgence peut être déclaré sur tout ou partie du territoire métropolitain, des départements d’outre-mer, des collectivités d’outre-mer régies par l’article 74 de la Constitution et en Nouvelle-Calédonie, soit en cas de péril imminent résultant d’atteintes graves à l’ordre public, soit en cas d’événements présentant, par leur nature et leur gravité, le caractère de calamité publique.
— Loi n° 55-385, art. 1
“A state of emergency may be declared over all or part of metropolitan territory, the overseas departments, the overseas collectivities governed by Article 74 of the Constitution and in New Caledonia, either in the event of imminent danger resulting from serious breaches of public order, or in the event of occurrences which, by their nature and gravity, have the character of a public calamity.” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
Loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme (2017)
A law (SILT, from its French title) adding to the Internal Security Code measures against terrorism: protection perimeters, closure of places of worship, searches and seizures, and individual control and surveillance ordered by the interior minister. A 2021 law repealed their end date.
Les chapitres VI à X du titre II du livre II du code de la sécurité intérieure sont applicables jusqu’au 31 décembre 2020.
— Loi n° 2017-1510, art. 5 II, as enacted
“Chapters VI to X of Title II of Book II of the Internal Security Code apply until 31 December 2020.” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
Loi n° 2021-998 du 30 juillet 2021 relative à la prévention d’actes de terrorisme et au renseignement (2021)
A law making the 2017 measures permanent and amending intelligence rules, including satellite interception and automated processing of network data. If the Prime Minister overrides an unfavourable CNCTR opinion, the case goes at once to the Conseil d’État, which rules within 24 hours.
Le II de l’article 5 de la loi n° 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme est abrogé.
— Loi n° 2021-998, art. 1
“Paragraph II of Article 5 of Law No. 2017-1510 of 30 October 2017 strengthening internal security and the fight against terrorism is repealed.” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
Loi n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique — art. 6-1 (2004; art. 6-1 inserted in 2014)
A law article: an administrative authority, not a judge, may request removal of content provoking or glorifying terrorism, child-sexual-abuse images or drug sales, then blocking by access providers. A qualified person designated by the Regulatory Authority for Audiovisual and Digital Communication checks them.
En l’absence de retrait de ces contenus dans un délai de vingt-quatre heures, l’autorité administrative peut notifier aux fournisseurs de services d’accès à internet la liste des adresses électroniques des services de communication au public en ligne contrevenant auxdits articles 421-2-5,227-23 et 222-39. […]
— Loi n° 2004-575, art. 6-1, I, second paragraph
“If the content is not removed within twenty-four hours, the administrative authority may notify internet access providers of the list of electronic addresses of the online public communication services contravening those articles. […]” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
Code des postes et des communications électroniques, art. L. 34-1 (restructured 2021; version since 2025)
An article of the Postal and Electronic Communications Code: when a serious threat to national security is established, the Prime Minister may order general retention of traffic and location data for one year, renewable. Retained data may not include the content of communications.
Pour des motifs tenant à la sauvegarde de la sécurité nationale, lorsqu’est constatée une menace grave, actuelle ou prévisible, contre cette dernière, le Premier ministre peut enjoindre par décret aux opérateurs de communications électroniques de conserver, pour une durée d’un an, certaines catégories de données de trafic […]
— Code des postes et des communications électroniques, art. L. 34-1, III, first paragraph
“For reasons of safeguarding national security, where a serious, current or foreseeable threat against it is established, the Prime Minister may by decree order electronic communications operators to retain, for one year, certain categories of traffic data […]” (unofficial translation by Claude, an AI)
European level
European Union
Digital Services Act (DSA) (2022)
A European Union (EU) regulation on online intermediaries: no general monitoring obligation may be imposed on them. On a recommendation of the European Board for Digital Services, the European Commission may require the providers of very large online platforms and search engines to act in a crisis.
For the purpose of this Article, a crisis shall be deemed to have occurred where extraordinary circumstances lead to a serious threat to public security or public health in the Union or in significant parts of it.
— Article 36(2)
ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC, Article 15 (2002; consolidated 2009)
An EU directive requiring Member States to ensure the confidentiality of electronic communications and to prohibit interception or surveillance by others without the users' consent, unless authorised by law under Article 15(1). That article lets Member States restrict these rights, including through data retention for a limited period.
Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the rights and obligations provided for in Article 5, Article 6, Article 8(1), (2), (3) and (4), and Article 9 of this Directive when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, […]
— Article 15(1)
Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article 4(2) (2016 consolidated edition)
A treaty article obliging the EU to respect its Member States' essential State functions. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that a national measure taken for national security is not, for that reason alone, exempt from EU law.
[…] It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.
— Article 4(2)
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Article 2(2) (2016)
The GDPR excludes activities outside EU law, such as national security (recital 16). Where it applies, Article 23 lets EU or national law restrict some of its rights and obligations to safeguard national security, if necessary, proportionate and respectful of the essence of fundamental rights.
This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a) in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; […]
— Article 2(2)
CJEU, La Quadrature du Net and Others (Joined Cases C‑511/18, C‑512/18 and C‑520/18) (2020)
On questions from France’s Conseil d’État and Belgium’s Constitutional Court, the CJEU’s Grand Chamber held that the ePrivacy Directive precludes preventive, general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data, but not a national-security retention instruction subject to effective review and limited in time.
[…] does not preclude legislative measures that: […] allow, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, recourse to an instruction requiring providers of electronic communications services to retain, generally and indiscriminately, traffic and location data in situations where the Member State concerned is confronted with a serious threat to national security that is shown to be genuine and present or foreseeable, […]
— Operative part, point 1
CJEU, Privacy International (Case C‑623/17) (2020)
On questions from the United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the CJEU’s Grand Chamber held that national legislation enabling a State authority to require communications providers to forward traffic and location data to security and intelligence agencies for national security fall within the ePrivacy Directive, despite Article 4(2) TEU.
[…] must be interpreted as precluding national legislation enabling a State authority to require providers of electronic communications services to carry out the general and indiscriminate transmission of traffic data and location data to the security and intelligence agencies for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
— Operative part, point 2
European Court of Human Rights (Council of Europe)
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 (1950)
A Council of Europe treaty signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. Article 8 protects private and family life, home and correspondence; since Protocol No. 11 (in force 1 November 1998), any person claiming to be a victim of a violation may apply to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, […]
— Article 8(2)
Klass and Others v. Germany (application no. 5029/71) (1978)
The ECtHR, sitting in plenary, accepted that secret surveillance can be necessary for national security under exceptional conditions, if adequate and effective guarantees against abuse exist. It found unanimously no breach of Articles 6, 8 or 13 of the Convention by the German rules the applicants challenged: Article 10 of the Basic Law and the G 10 law.
The Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it, affirms that the Contracting States may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.
— Paragraph 49
Roman Zakharov v. Russia (application no. 47143/06) (2015)
The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber found unanimously that Russia violated Article 8. It set a two-condition test for challenging surveillance legislation without proof of being targeted, and restated six minimum safeguards that the law should set out to avoid abuses of power.
The Court concludes that Russian legal provisions governing interceptions of communications do not provide for adequate and effective guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse which is inherent in any system of secret surveillance, and which is particularly high in a system where the secret services and the police have direct access, by technical means, to all mobile-telephone communications.
— Paragraph 302
Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom (applications nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15) (2021)
The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber held that bulk interception is not prohibited as such, but found unanimously that the United Kingdom’s bulk-interception regime under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 violated Article 8. Receiving intelligence from foreign services did not (twelve votes to five).
Therefore, in order to minimise the risk of the bulk interception power being abused, the Court considers that the process must be subject to “end-to-end safeguards”, meaning that, at the domestic level, an assessment should be made at each stage of the process of the necessity and proportionality of the measures being taken; […]
— Paragraph 350
Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden (application no. 35252/08) (2021)
The ECtHR’s Grand Chamber found the main features of Sweden’s bulk-interception regime met the Convention’s quality-of-law requirements. It found a violation of Article 8 (fifteen votes to two) over three shortcomings, including no effective after-the-fact review and no duty to weigh privacy before sharing abroad.
It finds, however, that the shortcomings mentioned in the preceding paragraphs are not sufficiently compensated by the existing safeguards and that, therefore, the Swedish bulk interception regime oversteps the margin of appreciation left to the authorities of the respondent State in that regard.
— Paragraph 373
Researched and drafted with Claude, an artificial intelligence, from the official texts the links open; approved for publication by Vincent Le Corre on 26 September 2026.